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INTRODUCTON

On December 22, 1998 the SEC adopted a new rule, Regulation ATS,'
and related rule amendments which took effect in early 1999. The changes
are designed to impose additional regulatory restraints on Alternative
Trading Systems (ATS) which compete against older financial markets
such as the NYSE and NASDAQ for order flow.' The SEC's articulated
justification for the new rules is based primarily on a desire to reduce
market fragmentation, taking as a given that market fragmentation hurts the
public good.' Market fragmentation is a situation in which the same
securities trade in different markets, possibly at different prices.' In
adopting these new rules, the SEC has ignored empirical economic
research containing statistical evidence that financial markets are well
integrated rather than fragmented.' The SEC also has ignored both
economic theory and evidence related to the benefits of allowing separate
markets to evolve which trade the same financial securities.6 Finally, the

1. Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 70843, 70844
(1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 202, 240, 242, 249) [hereinafter Regulation ATS].
2. Seeki.

3. See id. at 70845 (noting that some markets are not available to all and asserting without
basis that this creates disparities requiring action).
4. See Kathleen Hagerty & Robert L. McDonald, Brokerage,Market Fragmentation,and
Securities Market Regulation, in THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION OF THE
SECURiTIES INDUSTRY 35, 35 (Andrew W. Lo ed. 1996).

5. See generallyRegulationATS, supra note 1 (failing to refer to any statistical studies on
the integration between financial markets, although there are numerous published studies on the
topic); Bala Arshanapalli & John Doukas, The Linkages of S&P 500 Stock Index and S&P 500
Stock Index FuturesPricesduring October 1987,49 J. ECON. BUS. 253, 254 (1997) (finding that

the cash and futures markets operate as a single market); Frederick H. deB. Harris et al.,
Cointegration,ErrorCorrection,andPriceDiscovery on InformationallyLinkedSecurity Markets,

30 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 563, 578 (1995) (finding that security prices on the NYSE
adjust towards those in other markets and vice versa).
6. See, e.g., Hagerty & McDonald, supra note 4, at 37:
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SEC has ignored existing remedies for dealing with the alleged ill-effects
of market fragmentation, such as antitrust laws.7
In this Article, I argue that the SEC is overly concerned with
unsubstantiated and refuted ill effects of market fragmentation at the
expense of higher transaction costs in financial markets.8 In addition, and
even more significantly, I argue that the SEC is basing public policy on
anecdotal experience rather than economic theory and statistical evidence.9
There is no excuse for ignoring the economic literature when making
economic policy and the result of such behavior could severely damage the
U.S. economy as the financial sector is driven offshore or regulations lead
to higher transaction costs, inferior pricing, inefficiency, higher costs of

We find that fragmentation may be areflection of increased price competition, and
that the fragmented and competitive system provides better prices for customers
than the less-fragmented monopolistic broker case.
This view suggests that there is no "silver bullet" trading system that, if
implemented, would attract all order flow. Rather, it suggests that central markets
and brokerage markets serve different needs for different investors.
Id.
7. See Regulation ATS, supra note I, at 70845. Much of the SEC's concern with market
fragmentation appears to be over the fact that there have been instances in which a securities dealer
has simultaneously quoted one price in a retail market and another price in a different market not
available to retail customers. See id. (stating in a negative tone, "Through Instinct, market makers
were able to quote prices better than those made available to public investors. This private market
developed only because the activity on alternative trading systems is not fully disclosed, or
accessible, to public investors."). Without taking a position on the alleged harmful effects of such
activity and the merits of such a claim, such activity might be better treated as price discrimination
and pursued under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13.
8. Cf.Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failureof the
National Market System, 2 U. ILi. L. REv. 315, 341 (1985). The idea that the SEC is overly
concerned with market fragmentation is certainly not new to the legal literature; the present Article,
however, discusses new regulation related to recent technological innovations in financial markets
and places more emphasis on statistical analysis of data.
9. See generally Regulation ATS, supra note 1 (neither providing nor referring to any
research using actual data). As an example of the SEC's research, RegulationATS cites a report on
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) as containing evidence that widespread use
of an ATS by NASDAQ market makers had a significant impact on public investors. See id. at
70845. However, the citation to the report contained no page number, and I can find no "evidence"
of any sort in the 139 page document. See SECURITmS AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 21 (a) OFTHE SECURTES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 REGARDING THE NASD
ANDTHENASDAQMARKET(1996). Indeed, itis impossible for such evidence to exist because both
the ATS and NASDAQ at that point in time did not maintain order audit trail data. The impression
one gets is that SEC policy makers are basing decisions on stories told by interested parties without
looking at any actual data in spite of the fact that the agency has a staff of qualified economists at
its disposal. Cf.Gregg A. Jarrell, ChangeattheExchange: The CausesandEffects ofDeregulation,
27 J.L. &ECON. 273,307 (1984) (arguing that SEC actions are the result of political pressure rather
than part of a plan to promote economic welfare); Macey & Haddock, supra note 8, at 315.
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capital, and lower levels of investment. This Article attempts to fill a gap
in the discussion about ATS by focusing the attention of legal
commentators and regulators on economic theories and empirical evidence
which run contrary to the hypothesis that market fragmentation damages
financial markets in practice.
L BACKGROUND

A. TraditionalMarkets
Financial markets are organized in many alternative ways." A large
body of literature in economics and finance is devoted to the study of how
the rules of the market affect the performance of the market.11 This field of
study is called market microstructure. 2 The performance of the market can
be measured using a variety of methods.13
There is not one optimal set of rules for a financial market as different
market participants differ in their motives for trading and will be interested
in rules which optimize different dimensions of market performance.14 A
comprehensive survey of the various financial markets and rules of trade
employed is beyond the scope of this Article; however, a very brief
description of two of the most familiar financial markets is useful
background for understanding some of the issues raised by alternative
trading systems. Thus, I will give a brief summary of trading on the NYSE
and NASDAQ market.
It is first necessary to understand that investors and traders can place
different kinds of orders. 5 Two of the most important kinds of orders are
market orders and limit orders.1 6 A market order is a request to buy or sell
at the market price17 which is generally considered the best price
available." Individuals placing market orders are demanding immediacy
in transacting and pay a premium for it.' 9

10. See MAUREEN O'HARA, MARKEr MIcRosmuCruRE THEoRY 6-12 (1995).
11. See id. at l.
12. See id.
13. See Hans R. Stoll, Equity TradingCosts In-The-Large,19J. PORT2ILIOMGMT.41,41-42
(1993).
14. See Hagerty &McDonald, supranote4,at6l ('Thenarketin which all participants trade
in one place at one price is not necessarily the market preferred by all traders, and there is no
compelling reason for thinking it best in any sense.").
15. See ZvI BODIE ET Al, lNvEmhENT 76-78 (4th ed. 1999).
16. See id.
17. See id.
at 76.
18. See Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Law and Economics of Best Execution,
6 J.FiN. INTERMEDIATION 188, 191 (1997).
19. See Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting,82 Q.J. ECON. 33, 35-36 (1968).
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Limit orders are offers to buy at a price not to exceed some limit or sell
at not less than some limit.20 Individuals placing limit orders are supplying
immediacy and receive a premium for it.2 "A limit order to buy with a
limit price at or above the market is marketable in that it can be executed
immediately whereas a limit order to buy with a limit price below the
market is not marketable. ' ' 2
The NYSE concentrates trading in a specific security in a single
physical location-the specialist's post on the floor of the exchange.23 The
specialist is a member of the exchange who has been given additional
privileges and obligations to operate as a specialist for a particular
security.' At various times for various transactions, the specialist
sometimes acts as: a broker (agent); a dealer (principal); or an auctioneer.2
The market operates as a continuous auction in which the price is set to
equate supply and demand with immediate liquidity provided by the
specialist.26 When buy and sell orders come to the post simultaneously, the
specialist acts as an auctioneer-setting a price to clear the market.27
However, if only buy orders arrive at a given moment, the specialist acts
as a dealer and provides immediate liquidity by selling to the buyers from
his own inventory.28 Of course the specialist, like anyone, cannot earn a
living buying and selling at the same quote. Thus, the specialist always
posts two quotes: a bid reflecting the price he (or someone who has placed
a price-improving limit order) will pay sellers, and a higher asking price
reflecting the price he is willing to sell at.29 One common measure of
market performance is the size of the bid-ask spread.30
If a limit order arrives at the specialist's post between the spread (for
example, a limit order to buy with a limit price lower than the ask but
better than the bid) the specialist acts as a broker for that order, holding it
until a market order to sell comes in or until the ask price drops to the limit
20. See BODIE ET AL, supra note 15, at 77.
21. See Demsetz, supra note 19, at 36-37.
22. GORDONJ. ALEXANDER&WILLAMF. SHARPE, FUNDAMENTALS OFINVESTMENTS 38-39
(1989) (describing the process of placing a limit order).
23. See BODI ET AL, supra note 15, at 76.
24. See ALEXANDER & SHARPE, supra note 22, at 36.
25. See BODIE Er AL., supra note 15, at 78-79.
26. See O'HARA, supra note 10, at 10.
27. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 15, at 78 ("Mhe specialist system results in an auction
market .... In this role, the specialist acts merely as a facilitator.").
28. See Demsetz, supra note 19, at 37-38.
29. See Hans R. Stoll, The Economicsof MarketMaking, in THE NASDAQ HANDBOOK263,
266 (Douglas F. Parillo et al. eds., 1992) ("Market-making services are supplied in response to
economic rewards--the profit realized from buying at the bid price and selling at the ask price.").
30. See id. ("In competitive markets, the bid/ask spread reflects the cost of providing dealer
services-for dealers will not stay in business unless they are compensated for their costs, and new
dealers will enter if profits are too great.").
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price.31 Specialists have some market power in that they are the only ones
on the floor of the exchange quoting both sides of the market.3 2 In return
for this market power, they are charged with maintaining a fair and orderly
market.33 How well the specialist system has performed has been a subject
of heated debate in both the legal and economic literature.3
The NASDAQ market is an over-the-counter (OTC) market meaning
that there is no exchange or centralization of orders.3 5 OTC stocks traded
in NASDAQ are the most liquid OTC stocks, many of which qualify for
exchange listing but choose not to.3 6 All stocks in NASDAQ must have at
least two dealers making a market in the stock. The average number of
market makers in a stock exceeds ten and some stocks have more than
sixty market makers.3 8 An individual placing an order for a NASDAQ
stock first gives the order to his broker.39 Rather than route the order to the
specialist's post on the floor of the exchange, since there is none, the
broker looks on a terminal and sees which market makers are quoting the
best price.' The broker might then route the order to one of the dealers
quoting the best price, or fill it from his own inventory at that price.
Sometimes there might be an agreement in which the broker routes orders
to a particular dealer without regard to quote, but the dealer receiving such
orders has precommitted to fill them at the best quote regardless of whether
it is his.42 These agreements might involve cash payments to the broker or
other kinds of soft compensation (such as a quid pro quo) and thus, have
been controversial.43 However, notwithstanding the possibility of a
different commission, customers always have the right to give the broker

31. See BODIBETAL, supra note 15, at 78.
32. See id. at 70 ("[Slpecialists' access to their book of limit orders gives them unique
knowledge about the probable direction of price movement over short periods of time.").
33. See id. at 78.
34. See generally Dale Arthur Oesterle et al., The New York Stock Exchange and Its Out
Moded Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate to Survive, 17 J. CORP. L. 223, 223-310
(1992) (criticizing the specialist system and surveying the literature on this system).
35. See BODIESTAL, supra note 15, at 81.
36. See Reena Aggarwal & James J. Angel, Order-Driven Versus Quote-Driven Trading
Systems: The Case of the AMEX Emerging Company Marketplace 2 (Georgetown University
School of Business Administration Working Paper, 1993).
37. See Stoll, supra note 29, at 269.
38. See Mark Klock & D. Timothy McCormick, The Impact of Market Maker Competition
on NASDAQ Spreads, 34 FIN. REV. 55,61 (1999).
39. See BODIE E AL., supra note 15, at 81.
40. See ALEXANDER & SHARPE, supra note 22, at 42.
41. See Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A CriticalLook at the SEC's
NationalMarket System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 890 (1981).
42. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 18, at 212.
43. See id. at 206.
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specific instructions as to how or where they want an order executed.' The
NASDAQ system is based on the concept of competing dealers (market
makers) rather than a specialist through which orders are centralized."
The NASDAQ system did not facilitate price improvement in that there
was little or no opportunity for customers to obtain executions between the
spread. 6 There is no auction and there was no ability to display priceimproving limit orders.47 The NASD recently began phasing in a new
requirement for transparency (public display) of price improving limit
orders.48
The NASDAQ market is operated by a national securities association
and is not considered an alternative trading system.49 Nevertheless, the
issues that arise in examining how ATS affect the functioning of
NASDAQ and registered exchanges are the same as those which arose
when examining how NASDAQ affected the NYSE.5
Besides the NYSE's continuous auction with immediate liquidity
provided by specialists and NASDAQ's competing market maker models
of financial markets, there are many other alternatives such as periodic call
markets (e.g., orders collected and a price set every hour).5 ' This provides
a sufficient background for understanding the issues raised by ATS.
B. Alternative Trading Systems
An alternative trading system is essentially any system designed to
attract multiple buy and sell orders for financial securities and create a
price by means other than pure negotiation except for organizations which
were previously registered exchanges or the National Association of
Securities Dealers.52 ATS have at times been referred to as Proprietary
Trading Systems (PTS), Electronic Trading Systems, and Broker-Dealer

44. See id. at 194 (stating that if a customer directs a broker to execute a trade in a specific

manner the broker can satisfy the fiduciary duty without searching for a better price).
45. See Stoll, supra note 29, at 266.
46. See Poser, supra note 41, at 895 ("[TIhe OTC market provides no way for the orders of
a buying customer and a selling customer to meet directly .... The OTC market is therefore known
as a 'dealer' market.").
47. See ALEXANDER & SHARPE, supra note 22, at 42 n.12.
48. See 17 C.F.R. 240.1 1(A)(c)(1)-(4) (1999) [hereinafter Limit OrderDisplayRule].
49. See RegulationATS, supra note 1, at 70852.
50. See, e.g., Kalmen J. Cohen & Robert M. ConroyAn EmpiricalStudy ofthe Effect ofRule
19c-3, J.L. & ECON. 277, 279-80 (1990). There has been substantial research conducted on the
impact of trading NYSE-listed stocks on NASDAQ (fragmenting the order flow of these securities).
See id. The issues raised are the same as those which surface when debating the impact of trading
exchange-listed and NASDAQ securities on ATS.
51. See O'HARA, supra note 10, at 6-12.
52. See RegulationsM &ATS, 17 C.F.R. 242.300(a) (1999).
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Trading Systems.53 Instinet was the first ATS to draw regulatory action
from the SEC in 1969."4 Instinet is organized as a privately-owned on-line
trading system through which traders can enter orders and quotes without
revealing their identity. to a broker or anyone else."5
The methods for organizing an ATS vary considerably. 6 In addition to
the many different methods used for effecting securities transactions, there
are many different rules employed for anyone who has access to the ATS. s7
ATS can be used to effect anonymous large transactions between
institutions or market makers. 8 The type of user of an ATS probably
affects the organization of the ATS and vice-versa.5 9 Transactors have an
obvious economic incentive to use the trading system which optimizes
their most critical performance measures whether it be speed of
transacting,
anonymity, price improvement, price impact, or some other
6
measure. 0
C. Market Fragmentation
Market fragmentation is simply the existence of multiple markets for
trading the same item. There is no question that under certain conditions,
fragmentation of financial markets could have undesirable effects.6'
Economists would agree that given certain assumptions or performance
metrics, market fragmentation would produce undesirable consequences
in theory.63 However, whether the required assumptions represent a

53. See Regulation.ATS, supra note 1, at 70845 n.1.
54. See Ian Domowitz, An Exchange Is a Many-Splendored Thing: The Classificationand
Regulation of Automated Trading Systems, in THE INDUSTRIALORGANIZATION AND REGULATION
OFTHE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 93 (Andrew Wold ed. 1996).
55. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 18, at 175 n.17.
56. See Domowitz, supra note 54, at 96-97.
57. See id. at 103-04 (describing the relative flexibility ATS have in granting or denying
access).

58. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 18, at 175 n.17.
59. Cf. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior,Agency Costs andOwnershipStructure,3 J.FIN. ECON. 305,305 (1976) (explaining that
the type of business engaged in explains the organizational form).
60. SeeMacey&O'Hara, supranote 18, at 189. Forexample, there is no pointto savingfifty
cents on the price if the transaction costs an extra dollar in commission. See id. (stating that good
trade execution depends on a vector of attributes including price, timing of trades, mechanismused,
commission, and strategy employed).
61. See Hagerty & McDonald, supra note 4, at 35 ("A striking fact about the organization of
modem financial markets-and one of the great interest [sic] to market regulators and
exchanges-is the prevalence of market fragmentation, that is, multiple mechanisms or locations
for trading a security.").
62. See BODIE Er AL., supra note 15, at 81 (describing how customer orders can be traded
through).
63. See O'HARA, supra note 10, at 269 (describing how a single monopolistic system could
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suitable model of reality, whether the magnitude of the undesirable effects
is material, and whether there might not be offsetting benefits from market
fragmentation is essentially an empirical question."
A simple economic model might assume the following three features:
1) all participants have the same objective function, 5 2) all participants
have the same information, and 3) the technology of the market is fixed
and is a Walrasian auction.' Under these assumptions there would be
advantages to centralizing all orders and disadvantages to market
fragmentation. 7 The reasoning behind this is that under the above
assumptions, everyone measures the market's performance in the same
way; no one has an information advantage and therefore no market
structure can enhance or mitigate such an advantage; and transactions
occur without cost.6 8 Fragmenting the market would reduce liquidity and
price discovery leading to worse execution prices for some, greater
variation or uncertainty in the market, and simultaneous trading of the
same security at different prices 69 To understand how this might negatively
be optimal in theory); Hagerty & McDonald, supra note 4, at 35 ('T'o the extent that securities
markets provide a central trading location serving to minimize the search cost of finding a
counterparty, fragmentation is a puzzle.").
64. Cf.O'HARA, supra note 10, at 269 (stating that the simple view does not capture the
complexity of the process and that segmenting trading could provide more social welfare than a
single market).
65. The objective function mathematically formalizes the attributes which matter to the
participants and the rate at which participants are willing to trade off these attributes against one
another. An exampleof a standard objective function would be one in which the only two attributes
which mattered are the expected value of terminal wealth and the variance of that terminal wealth.
To assume that all participants have the same objective function means that everyone is willing to
trade off risk and expected wealth at the same rate. If we further assume a multiperiod model where
new information is revealed each period and firms make investment decisions and issue or
repurchase securities at that time while individuals simultaneously rebalance their portfolios we
would have a simple model of trading behavior.
66. See O'HARA, supranote 10, at4. A Walrasian auction is a fictitious process by which the
price which causes the number of buy orders to equal the number of sell orders is determined and
assets are costlessly exchanged. See id.
67. Cf.Robert Battalio et al., Do Competing Specialists and PreferencingDealersAffect
Market Quality?, 10 REV. FIN. STUDIES 969, 970 (1997) (pointing out that proponents of
concentrating orders in a single location argue that investors will get quicker and cheaper
execution).
68. See Lawrence Harris, Consolidation,Fragmentation,Segmentation, andRegulation, in
GLOBAL EQUITY MARKETS: TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITIVE AND REGULATORY CHALLENGES 269,
272 (Robert A. Schwarz ed. 1995) ("Consolidation can be best understood by momentarily
adopting a simple but highly unrealistic assumption. Assume that all traders and all trading
problems that they face are identical ....If this extreme assumption were true, all traders would
want to trade in the same market in which all other traders trade.").
69. Since people could send their orders to different markets, the price which clears sell and
buy orders could differ. Furthermore, each price would convey information about only a subset of
supply and demand as opposed to aggregate supply and demand.
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affect the market, consider that limit orders to buy with low limit prices
might be executed in one market while price-improving limit orders to buy
entered into a different market might remain unfilled.70 The fact that this
scenario leads to negative consequences resulting from market

fragmentation notwithstanding, we do not know just how severely market
performance would be affected. That is an empirical question.
Furthermore, it is an empirical question of little importance because such
a world is only hypothetical, and the differences between the real and
hypothesized world are significant.71 Technology is clearly not fixed:
Beyond a doubt, information technology will profoundly alter
the business of investing, largely for the better ....
First, technological advancement in the investment
business serves to lower search and transaction costs. As a
result, information technology will be a significant benefit to
investors and thus to the process of capital formation, insofar
as the "investment process" in essence involves little more
than the efficient management of such costs. A principal
strategic objective of any scheme for regulating technologybased investment services should be to allow the investing
community to capture these cost reductions. 2
Technology is improving and will continue to improve as long as there
are incentives to invest in technology.73 The costs of the marketplace are
not fixed.74 Participants do not all have the same information and those
trading or making a market in a security are aware of the adverse selection

70. See Thomas H. Melnish & Robert A. Wood, Hidden Limit Orders on the NYSE, 21 J.
PORTFOLUOMGMT. 19,22 (1995). For anumerical example, considera situation in which the market

maker is quoting 50, 50.25 and someone enters a limit order to buy at 50.125. This limit order
might not be known in parallel markets. Thus a different customer might buy the stock at 50.25 in
the parallel market while the original customer considered has an unfilled order. This is known as
a "trade-through." See id. It should be noted that there has been other recent regulatory action
independent of Regulation ATS to reduce trade-throughs. The NASD, under SEC pressure, is in the
process of phasing in new order handling rules which require market makers to display priceimproving limit orders from customers. See Limit Order Display Rule, supra note 48.
71. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 7 (1988) ("Markets are

institutions that exist to facilitate exchange, that is, they exist in order to reduce the cost of carrying
out exchange transactions. In an economic theory which assumes that transaction costs are
nonexistent, markets have no function to perform .... ).
72. Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities

Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 803 (1985).
73. Cf. J. Harold Mulherin et al., Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial
Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J.L. EcON. 591, 643 (1991) (arguing that

innovation by financial exchanges is induced by providing strong property rights).
74. See O'HARA, supra note 10, at 6 (arguing that the market, and therefore the cost, is not
exogenous).
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problem-that the opposing party might have superior information and
would take advantage of the uninformed. 5 Conversely, some participants
have the same information, and those trading or making a market in a
security are aware of the adverse selection problem-that the opposing
party might have superior information and would take advantage of the
uninformed.76 Furthermore, not all participants have the same objective
function: "Markets fragment because traders are not all identical and
because the trading problems they face are not all identical. The same
fundamental asset may simultaneously trade in different market structures
because different structures better serve the needs of some traders than
others."7 7 Others are most concerned about transaction costs and are
willing to trade the risk of a price change for lower transaction costs.7" Yet
others, such as a pension fund trading 20,000 shares, will be concerned
with hiding their identity and the total amount they wish to trade in order
to avoid the impact this would have on the execution price.79
Of course even if it were desirable not to have a fragmented market,
there would be no need to impose it by regulation. "If the best market
system would be a consolidated system, regulators do not need to impose
one on identical traders. They will choose it for themselves. Any regulatory
efforts to impose a consolidated system risk choosing the wrong system
and/or stifling innovation."'
There are some ancillary effects which could arise from market
fragmentation as well. The existence of different markets means that
brokers have choices about where to send their orders. Market makers can
enter into arrangements known as preferencing agreements in which
brokers agree to send all orders meeting certain conditions to a particular
market maker in return for something, often cash.8 This practice is known
as payment for order flow. Of course brokers have an obligation to their
customers to get the best reasonably available price," but industry practice

75. See id.at 53-75 (surveying the literature on adverse selection models of trading).
76. See Harris, supra note 68, at 274-75.
77. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 18, at 189 (stating that the best execution encompasses
many different attributes).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 195 n.17 ("Traders, particularly large institutions, conduct large transactions
on Instinet without any revelation of their identity, thereby enabling them to avoid the adverse
market reaction that would accompany the revelation of their identity.").
80. Harris, supra note 68, at 274.
81. See Robert H. Battalio, Third Market Broker-Dealers: Cost Competitors or Cream
Skimmers?, 52 J. FIN. 341, 343 (1997).
82. See Lois E. Lightfoot et al., OrderPreferencingand Market Quality on United States
Equity Exchanges 1 n.3 (SEC Working Paper, 1999).
83. See Macey & O'Hara, supranote 18, at 191. But see id. at 192 (stating that best execution
need not strictly mean best price).
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is to treat this obligation as fulfilled by giving the customer trade execution
at the best available publicly displayed quote (known as the National Best
Bid or Offer, NBBO).8 4 It is possible that there is someone out there
willing to trade at a better price, but the broker does not have to search for
it.85 Preferencing arrangements stipulate that when orders are preferenced
to a particular market maker, the trade will be executed at the best
available quote even though the preferenced market maker might be
quoting an inferior price.86 If an ATS pays brokers for orders which would
have otherwise been sent to the floor of the NYSE, the result is clearly
more fragmentation of order flow.
The practices of preferencing and payment for order flow have been
controversial.87 They are not necessarily bad,88 but they raise interesting
empirical questions, and empirical evidence should be examined before
regulations are written.
II. HIGHLIGHTS OF REGULATIONATS

A. General Overview
The SEC's RegulationATS adopts a new regulatory framework for the
regulation of securities markets designed to increase the regulation of
alternative trading systems.89 The framework is essentially comprised of
two parts.' ° One involves a change in the definition of "exchange" and rule
amendments related to the regulation of exchanges, national securities
associations, and brokers and dealers.91 The other is the new Regulation
ATS which defines alternative trading systems and imposes new regulatory
requirements on them.' Previously, alternative trading systems were
generally treated as broker-dealers.93 Now, while the ATS have the option

84. See In re Merrill Lynch, 911 F. Supp. 754, 772 (D. N.J. 1995). While the summary
judgment granted in this case was reversed on appeal, the appellate court simply stated that there
was a material dispute of facts as to whether the additional costs and delay from searching for a
better quote would offset any potential gain. See id.; see also Newton v. Merrill, 135 F.3d 266, 272
(3d Cir. 1998). Transacting at the NBBO is still the dominant practice. See id. at 274.
85. See MerrillLynch, 911 F. Supp. at 770.
86. See Oliver Hansch et al., Preferencing, Internalization,Best Execution, and Dealer
Profits 1 (London Business School Working Paper, 1998).
87. See id.
88. See id. at 24 (stating that the practice of preferencing has not resulted in collusive profits).
89. See Regulation ATS, supra note 1, at 70845.
90. See id. at 70847 (identifying the principal components of the new regulatory framework
as a new interpretation of "exchange" and the regulatory structure for ATS).
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 70845 n.l.
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to continue to register as broker-dealers, they are subject to significantly
more regulatory requirements. a
The new general framework significantly expands the definition of
exchange beyond what it had been.95 The SEC has by rule asserted the
statutory definition of exchange under the Exchange Act.96 New Rule 3b16 "interprets" an exchange as including:
any organization, association, or group of persons that: (1)
brings together the orders of multiple buyers and sellers; and
(2) uses established, non-discretionary methods (whether by
providing a trading facility or by setting rules) under which
such orders interact with each other, and the buyers and
sellers entering such orders agree to the terms of a trade.97
The definition is quite broad and covers a wide range of activities which
were not previously considered to be covered under the statutory definition
of exchange. 98
The second major ingredient of the new framework is RegulationATS,
which defines the term ATS. 99 In effect, the definition of an ATS is a
subset of the definition of an exchange-in other words, every ATS is an
exchange but not every exchange is an ATS. An ATS is permitted to
register as an ATS under RegulationATS. 1°° Any organization registered
under Regulation ATS is not required to register as an exchange even
though it meets the SEC's new interpretation of an exchange. 10' Any
trading system registered as an exchange or operated by a national
securities association is exempt from Regulation ATS.' ° Thus, a trading
system which meets the definition of an exchange but not that of an ATS
must register as an exchange or be operated by a national securities
association.103 However, a trading system which meets the definition of an
ATS has the option of registering as an exchange, being operated by a

94. See id. at 70847.
95. See id. at 70900 (referring to the old interpretation of exchange as narrow and the new
interpretation as expanded).
96. See id.at 70847; see alsoid. at 70900 n.539 (citing legal authority supporting an agency's
discretion to revise its interpretation of a statutory definition).
97. Id. at 70848.
98. See id. at 70898 (noting that the statutory definition of exchange is broad and claiming
that the SEC can apply the definition flexibly and that the SEC had previously interpreted the
definition narrowly).
99. See id. at 70859.
100. See id. at 70847.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Seeid.
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national securities association, or registering under Regulation ATS.'0 4 It
should be noted that there is a catch-all provision by which the SEC can
require an ATS opting to register under Regulation ATS when "an
exemption from exchange regulation is not necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or consistent with the protection of investors.""0 5
B. Scope of Exchange Definition
RegulationATS contains considerable discussion and illustrations of the
application of its new definition of exchange.0 6 An illustration of what lies
clearly outside the scope of an exchange is a broker-dealer using a
telephone to negotiate trades. 7 This is outside the scope of the definition
since it involves negotiation of trades.'0 At the other extreme, an
automated trading system whereby buy and sell orders are submitted and
a computer algorithm determines prices and executions would appear to be
clearly within the scope and generally is." 9 However, there are some gray
areas. Large brokerage firms have automated systems for efficiently
managing and routing order flow. "0 These systems frequently cross orders
internally and might do so using non-discretionary methods."' Yet the
Commission specifically states that it is not its intention to cover this kind
of activity and specifically excludes internal systems." 2 What is merely an
internal system versus what is an exchange is not explained well.
Furthermore, there are other inconsistencies. A single dealer system which
executes orders at the inside NASDAQ quote is not considered an
exchange." 3 While the internal system of a retail brokerage firm is
excluded, the Commission indicates that it believes most Inter-Dealer
Brokers (IDBs) fall within the definition of exchange." 4
IDBs economic function is exactly the same as that of a retail broker,
just on a different scale for a different kind of customer." 5 While the

104. See id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 70854-56.
107. See id. at 70847 ("[The new rule] explicitly excludes those systems that the Commission
believes perform only traditional broker-dealer activities.").

108. See id. at 70850.
109. See id. at 70851.
110. See id. at 70854 (stating that automated trading systems of single dealer merely allow
more efficient execution).
111. See id. (describing how automated dealer systems can match orders).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 70853 ("As a general matter... the Commission believes that most IDBs would
be covered by the definition in Rule 3b-16(a) and not excluded by any of its exclusions.").
115. See O'HARA, supra note 10, at 48-50 (stating that the fundamental processes of the
interdealer and public markets are the same).
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Commission provides somejustification for considering IDBs to be within
the scope of the rule," 6 the same justification applies to the internal
systems of retail brokerage. Although the SEC does not attempt to explain
it this way, the decision appears to turn on whether the system involves
retail brokerage or brokerage at the wholesale level. The SEC's attempt to
justify the distinction appears to be based upon a belief that IDBs play an
active role in displaying quotes and soliciting parties to transact while retail
brokers do not.11 7 However, retail brokers have Internet Web sites by which
customers can view quotes and place orders which are effectively no
different than the IDB.1" Thus, the Commission has not distinguished the
difference between the operation of an IDB and a retail brokerage with
Internet access internalizing orders, but has indicated fairly clearly that one
will be regulated and one will not."19
Furthermore, extremely aggressive activity which is .perhaps more
likely by a retail broker, such as calling and soliciting business by
telephone, is not subject to the regulation. 2 ' An additional irony is that
retail brokers often act as dealers making markets in the stock and buy
from one customer while selling to another at a different price. 2 1 IDBs
generally merely effect the trade between two parties and receive a
commission.' Thus, the SEC's regulatory structure is like putting more
regulation on a floor broker than a specialist on the exchange. Even
without considering the economic function of financial markets, it is
difficult to understand what the SEC is trying to do other than expand and
blur regulation." This creates some sympathy for the view previously
expressed by others that the SEC merely reacts to political pressure and has
been captured by the dominant institutions making markets (such as the
NYSE and NASDAQ). 2 4 An alternative view is that the SEC is merely
clumsy.12
116. See Regulation ATS, supra note 1, at 70853.
117. Seeki.
118. See, e.g., Brown & Co. (visited Oct. 19, 1999) <http://www.brownco.com>.
119. See RegulationATS, supra note 1, at 70853.
120. See id. at 70852 (specifically excluding "traditional" brokerage activity from the new
regulations).
121. See In re Merrill Lynch, 911 F. Supp. 754,757 (D. N.J. 1995).
122. SeeFRANKJ.FABOZZI,BoNDMARKET,ANALYSiS,ANDSTRATEGIES 118 (1996) ("[IDBs]
never trade for their own account, and they keep the names of the dealers involved in trades
confidential.").
123. Cf Macey & O'Hara, supranote 18, at 198 ("[A]bsent a better understanding of either
the markets or the transactions they are regulating, the SEC has little choice but to choose a process
and hope that it results in the desired objective.").
124. See Jarrell, supra note 9, at 307; Macey & Haddock, supra note 8, at 361.
125. See Harold Mulherin, Comment to Thomas H.Mclnish & RobertA. Wood, Competition,
Fragmentation,andMarket Quality, in THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGUIATION OFTHE
SECURITIES INDUSTRY 74, 77 (Andrew W. Lo ed., 1996) (stating that improved market quality
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C. Scope of ATS Definition
An alternative trading system is now defined with a two part test under
RegulationATS as any system that: 1)meets the definition of an exchange;
and 2) but does not perform self-regulatory functions, set rules governing
conduct outside the system, or discipline members.1 26 The definition is
constructed so that any system which performs self-regulatory functions
does not have the option of registering under RegulationATS and evading
full treatment as an exchange.127 So any system which would meet the
definition of an ATS but for the fact that it performs self-regulatory
functions must register as an exchange.'28 Any ATS can choose to register
as either an exchange or an ATS.129 But the SEC can still require an
exchange without self-regulatory features which chooses to register as an
ATS to also register as an exchange through
30 a catch-all provision if it finds
such action to be in the public interest
D. Key Elements of Regulation ATS
The requirements for alternative trading systems subject to Regulation
ATS contain nine parts. 31 However, it is immediately apparent that two
parts are both key and controversial as two-thirds of the pages are
dedicated to two elements: market transparency and fair access.33 The
requirement of membership in a self-regulatory organization (SRO) is also
arguably a major element-since that is the SEC' s method of assuring that
an audit trail exists. 133 The other components are things such as notice,
security standards, inspections, recordkeeping, reporting, and
confidentiality." These are all relatively minor ancillary provisions which
will not be dealt with in order to focus on transparency, access, and SRO
membership.
Transparency refers to the public's ability to see the best quote
available.131 Suppose that the highest quoted bid in the NASDAQ system

would be brought about by "the invisible band of the market rather than the visible, and clumsy,
hand of the SEC").

126. See Regulation ATS, supra note 1, at 70859.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 70857.
131. See id. at 70844.
132. About two-thirds of the pages (12 of 18) laying out the regulation deal with these two
items. See id. at 70863-80.
133. See id. at 70863.
134. See id. at 70844.
135. See O'HARA, supra note 10, at 252.
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is fifty and the lowest quoted ask is fifty and a quarter. One investor might
enter a limit order to sell at fifty and an eighth or higher, which would be
a better price to the seller than the fifty offered by the dealer. Other
potential buyers might be interested in buying at fifty and an eighth but are
deterred from entering an offer given the quoted ask of fifty and a quarter.
If the limit order sitting between the spread were to be transparent to the
public, it is possible that the market would function better by providing
higher volume, faster execution, and more information about price.
The NASDAQ market is in the process of phasing in new order
handling rules to require dealers to publicly display limit orders which
better their quotes."' This is improving transparency, but still does not deal
with the situation in which a price-improving limit order is entered into an
alternative trading system which is not displayed publicly. The primary
intent of Regulation ATS is to make such orders transparent to the
public.137 Under RegulationATS, alternative trading systems will have to
publicly display to the whole world orders in covered securities (essentially
all exchange-listed and NASDAQ securities) which are displayed to more
than one system subscriber if the system has five percent of the trading
volume in the security.'
The second key element of Regulation ATS is to provide "fair" access
to publicly displayed quotes. 39 Under certain conditions, an ATS must
allow nonsubscribers to trade against publicly displayed orders on equal
terms with subscribers. " This would appear to remove much of the benefit
of subscribing to an ATS and could be a serious setback to those who
would seriously threaten the order flow to the NYSE and NASDAQ. 141The
interesting twist in the regulation is that the fair access requirement only
applies when the ATS has attained five percent of the trading volume in a
security. 142
136. See Limit OrderDisplay Rule, supra note 48.
137. See Regulation ATS, supra note 1, at 70847 (stating that it is in the public interest to
require certain systems to integrate their orders into the public quote stream).
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 70870-71.
141. For example, dealers need to build up or lower their inventory. Whenever they do this
through the use of public orders, they run the risk of trading against an informed trader, possibly
an officer of the corporation, with superior knowledge about the company's outlook. This raises
their risks and costs and requires a larger spread to cover the costs. If the dealers could setup their

own ATS which would be accessible only to the dealers, they could eliminate this risk and trade
amongst themselves at lower costs and a lower spread than is available to the public. In a
competitive environment, these cost savings would be passed along to the public. Regulation ATS

effectively prohibits accomplishing this.
142. See RegulationATS, supranote 1,at 70865 (requiring integration of these orders into the
public quote). Any order integrated into the public quote is required to be accessible. See id. at
70869.
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While the SEC has provided some rationale for requiring access in
general, it has not provided a clear rationale for not requiring access for
lower market shares and requiring it for higher market shares, nor has it
explained the magic behind the five percent threshold.'43 A good guess is
that the SEC recognizes the cost burden imposed by providing access to
nonsubscribers of the systems with small market share, but "fair" for
systems with a high market share. 44 Of course this structure appears to
penalize success. Furthermore, the SEC appears to suggest that it really
does not know what the appropriate threshold is and that it will play
around with the threshold in the future. 45 This is obviously an extremely
clumsy method of policy making. A further irony is that this could actually
promote market fragmentation. Many small systems, possibly with the
same owner, can operate without providing access-but two large systems
would have to provide access.
A final element of the fair access requirement is access to membership
in the ATS.' 46 This part of the access requirement applies when the trading
volume threshold is meet for four of the previous six months. 47 The
requirement comes into play once an ATS attains twenty percent of the
volume in a covered security. 148 At that point, the ATS must provide
objective standards for membership which are to be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner49 In other words, a very successful ATS, such as
Instinet, will have to open its doors and allow competitors to become
members. The effect of this requirement is to destroy the ability of a large
system to maintain any property rights in intangible capital and hence
destroys incentives to make significant investment in the creation of
intangible capital. 50 Consider the following historical observation:
The prices on financial exchanges arise only because of
the effective operation of the exchanges. Furthermore, the
exchanges themselves represent a process that evolves in
response to technological innovations via the contracting
143. See id. at 70867 (discussing public comment and SEC response over the five percent
threshold).
144. Cf.id. at 70867 ("[Ihe Commission believes that those alternative trading systems with
less than five percent of the volume would not add sufficiently to transparency to justify the costs
associated with linking to a market.").
145. Cf.id. at 70873 n.245 ("The Commission intends to monitor the impact and effect of
these fair access rules... and will consider changing these rules if necessary ...
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Cf.Mulherin et al., supra note 73, at 611 ('The courts recognized the property right in
the quotes and the importance of the property right in providing the incentives to develop the

quotes.").
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allowed by the courts in response to those innovations.
Indeed, the courts have recognized the necessity for legal
innovation when dealing with the contracts and prices of
financial exchanges. The courts made new precedent by
considering abstract items such as quotes on financial
instruments to be property. By allowing the exchanges to
establish rights to such property, they enabled the exchanges
to reap the gains from technological innovation and thereby
promoted the growth of exchanges in the United States.
... Financial innovation arises from stronger definition of
property rights.... ."'
The third key element of Regulation ATS is the requirement for
membership in an SRO.152 The purpose of this is to assure that surveillance
systems exist for the ATS. 5 3 This is not unreasonable, but the method
chosen puts an ATS in the precarious position of having to become a
member of an SRO run by5 4a competitor or having to accept full-blown
treatment as an exchange.1

Ill. THE POTENTiAL BENEFITS OF FRAGMENTED
(PARALLEL) MARKETS
There are at least two significant benefits which can arise from the
existence of parallel securities markets. First, the existence of parallel
markets can result in competition between the markets to build a better
mousetrap.' 55 This competition creates incentives for investment. Real
resources will be invested in price discovery, new technology, and better
rules.
Second, parallel markets permits specialization in which different
markets are structured to the varying needs of different clienteles:
[I]t seems unreasonable to argue that best execution requires
executing trades at prices drawn from other trading structures,
ignoring that each trading structure provides a different vector
of execution of attributes and services a different clientele. If
alternative markets provide other benefits to traders, then

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 626.
See Reguldtion ATS, supra note 1, at 70863.
See id.
See id. ("The Commission understands some alternative trading systems may have

concerns about SROs abusing their regulatory authority for competitive reasons. While the
Commission understands that SROs operate competing markets and, therefore, have potential
conflicts of interest in overseeing alternative trading systems.... .).

155. See Harris, supra note 68, at 270 ('[M]arket structures compete to serve diverse
traders.").
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focusing narrowly on the trade prices misses the property that
trade execution is a multi-dimensional process. r '
There are trade-offs between different dimensions of market making
and some markets could be better at providing immediacy of trading while
others could be better at reducing adverse selection costs.157 In fact, there
have been quite a few empirical economic studies demonstrating that
different market structures work better for different participants in
contrasting environments. 8
A. Competitive Incentives to Invest in
TechnologicalDevelopment
The standard assumption which generates the result that a centralized
market leads to superior pricing and liquidity over fragmented markets is
that the price setting process is provided by a Walrasian auctioneer.'59 In
other words, it is assumedthat the technology underlyingthe marketplace
isfixed.' This is a convenient simplifying assumption in developing an
economic model to provide a first approximation for studying certain
aspects of market making; however, it is an assumption which is clearly
16
not true and is critical with respect to other aspects of market making. 1
This assumption takes both the number (indeed, the existence) of markets
and the structure of the markets as exogenous and is clearly useless when
one wishes to endogenize markets and investigate the dynamic nature of
market development. 6 2 Indeed, discussing markets with no costs is not
very useful other than as the roughest first approximation
to assist in
163
understanding the potential gains from trading.
Transaction costs exist, and technology frequently changes these
156. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 18, at 220.
157. See id.at 218 ("Exchanges in competition with one another, and that vary in the provision
and cost of information, also vary in other key factors such as liquidity. This leads competing
markets to attract different market participants.") (footnote omitted).
158. See Aggarwal & Angel, supra note 36, at 8; Michele LaPlante & Chris J. Muscarella, Do
Institutions Receive ComparableExecution in the NYSE and NASDAQ Markets?A Transaction
Study of Block Trades, 45 J. FIN. ECON. 97, 98 (1997) (stating that the structure of the NYSE
provides institutions more liquidity for large block transactions); Marc R. Reinganum, Market
MicrostructureandAsset Pricing:An EmpiricalInvestigation of NYSE andNASDAQ Securities,
28 J. FIN. ECoN. 127, 137 (1990) (stating that the structure of the NASDAQ market provides more
liquidity to small firms than the structure of the NYSE, but this is not true for large firms).
159. See O'HARA, supranote 10, at4 (describing the fiction of the Walrasian auction and the
resulting equilibrium price).
160. See id.
161. See id. at 6 ("The question of how prices are set thus takes on a complexity far removed
from the simplicity of the Walrasian auctioneer.").
162. See id.
163. See COASE,supra note 71, at 7-8.
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costs. " Technological development has always changed securities markets
significantly and is certain to continue to do so.'65 The SEC admits as
much when it notes, "Market participants have incorporated technology
into their businesses to provide investors with an increasing array of
services, and to furnish these services more efficiently, and often at lower
prices."'" Obviously more services at lower costs is good and
technological development within financial markets should therefore be
encouraged rather than discouraged.
A historical treatment of several technological developments in
securities markets is provided by Mulherin, Netter, and Overdahl. 67
Professor Mulherin and his colleagues investigate the invention of the
stock price ticker and the telegraph providing wide dissemination of price
quotes; the development of exchanges trading standardized equity options;
and recent innovations in financial engineering including the development
of hybrid securities. 6 The analysis demonstrates that the technology
underlying financial markets is not fixed. 169 Furthermore, markets have
incentives to invest in building a better mousetrap if their property rights
in price quotes are protected. 70 17Poorly conceived regulatory rules can of
course impede these incentives. 1
Technological improvements in economic models which price
securities, such as the development of the Black-Scholes option pricing
model, 72 have resulted in the wide-spread realization that securities can
easily be replicated in liquid, developed, free markets.'73 For example, one
can create a position identical to holding a share of stock by purchasing a
call option on the stock, selling a put option on the stock, and investing the
present value of the strike price in a riskless security." Thus, even if all
equity trading were centralized, market fragmentation will still exist in that

164. See Stoll, supra note 13, at 41 (noting that investors are paying the salaries of 430,000
securities industry employees and the cost ofsignificant computer and communication equipment).
165. See id. at 48 (stating that trading costs have been declining over time).
166. Regulation ATS, supra note 1, at 70845.
167. See Mulherin et al., supra note 73.
168. Seeid. at592.
169. See id. at 626 (applying historical lessons from technological innovation in financial
markets to current regulatory policy).
170. See id. at 643-44. The restrictive regulation of financial exchanges can be expected to
hinder their innovative capacity. See id.
171. See id. "The attempted restriction of the actions of exchanges that stems from a
misunderstanding oftheir role in the economy can be expected to raise transaction costs and thereby
hinder, rather than promote, the innovative capacity of financial exchanges." Id.
172. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricingof Optionsand CorporateLiabilities,
81 J. POL. ECON. 637, 637 (1973).
173. See JOHN HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVE SECURITIES 325-26 (1989)
(explaining how a riskless security can be created from derivative and underlying securities).
174. Seeid. at ll6.
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equivalent securities can (and will) be traded in other markets. 7 5 These
markets could well exist off-shore and beyond the reach of the SEC.
It is also important to note that, "all of the extensive technological
innovations in market mechanisms during the past thirty years have been
initiated by the regional exchanges, the third-market dealers, and the
proprietary trading systems (PTS), with the NYSE matching innovations
to avoid loss of market share .... Dominant competitors have little
incentive to innovate." '76
The concept that better rules can result from parallel markets also has
support in the work of Professor Romano.' 77 Romano persuasively argues
that securities regulation would be more effective if federal securities laws
were modified to permit a menu approach under which firm could elect to
have their securities regulated under the laws of any of the fifty States or
the District of Columbia.17 Competitive rulemaking, it is argued, results
in more rapid discovery of effective solutions to specific problems and
migration towards the efficient solution.'79 Professor Romano notes that
such competition of corporate charters has resulted in uniformity among
corporate charters while enabling the development of improved laws. 8
The same reasoning can be applied to parallel markets self-regulation. If
parallel markets are not only allowed to exist, but encouraged to exist
through the protection of their property rights in price quotes and
incentives to invest in price discovery, they will also have incentives to
compete in the arena of self-regulation and migrate towards the most
efficient self-regulation.
Regulation is obviously not the only arena in which financial markets
could compete. Competition could also occur in designing the optimal
rules for priority of orders, an auction process, etc. It has been argued that
"the principal arena for competition is technology, not price."181

175. See O'HARA, supra note 10, at 216 (stating that the ability to trade derivative securities
"allows traders to transact virtually identical instruments in multiple markets.").
176. Thomas H. Mclnish & Robert A. Wood, Competition, Fragmentation,and Market
Quality,in TEINDUSTRIALORGANIZATION AND REGULATIONOFTHE SECURIrIES INDUSTRY 63, 84-

85 (Andrew W. Lo ed. 1996).
177. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L. 2359, 2361 (1998).
178. See id. at 2361-62.
179. See id. at 2427 (stating that "[c]ompetitive federalism harnesses the high-powered
incentives of markets to the regulatory state in order to produce regulatory arguments compatible
with investors' preferences").
180. See id. at 2362, 2427 (stating that "such regulatory competition does not harm, and in all
likelihood benefit, investors").
181. McInish & Wood, supra note 176, at 84.
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B. Adverse Selection
Another assumption underlying the simplified economic model which
generates the result that a centralized market is efficient is the assumption
that all investors have the same objective function and the same
information.' Trading occurs because of different endowments and lifecycle needs. The SEC's RegulationATS seems to be firmly rooted in the
belief that this assumption is true. If the greatest fallacy underlying the
"market fragmentation is bad" theory is that trading is costless, the greatest
part of that fallacy is that there are no adverse selection costs. There is a
great deal of economic literature on the significant adverse selection costs
faced by dealers in market making activity.'83
It is absolutely critical that the policy makers understand that different
players have differing motives for trading and differ in the needs which
they want fulfilled when trading. 8" There is a good deal of economic
theory and empirical evidence on this issue, which suggests that market
fragmentation improves market performance for this reason. One recent
model is provided by Hagerty and McDonald, which generates the
conclusion that
brokerage crossing markets that are fragmented and
competitive provide better prices for (uninformed) customers
than do monopolistic brokerage crossing markets ....The
authors formally prove that competitive brokers who can
discriminate between informed and uninformed traders will,
and must, charge different commissions to the two types of
traders ....This conclusion is very important because such
discrimination can be effected only in a fragmented market.
It cannot be provided in an8 5 anonymous central market to
which all orders are routed.
As Hagerty and MacDonald write, "The market in which all participants
trade in one place at one price is not necessarily the market preferred by all
traders and
there is no compelling reason for thinking it best in any
86
sense."
A recent empirical investigation of fragmentation is presented by
McInish and Wood." 7 They construct matched portfolios of stocks in a
182. See Harris, supra note 68,at 272.
183. See, e.g., Mark Klock, MainstreamEconomics and the Case for ProhibitingInside
Trading, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 329-30 (1994) (explaining how asymmetric information
decreases liquidity and citing some of the economic literature to that effect).
184. See Harris,supra note 68, at 274.
185. Hagerty & McDonald, supra note 4, at 56-57.
186. Id.at 61.
187. See Mclnish & Wood, supra note 176, at 63.
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manner so as to ensure that the attributes of the portfolios are identical
except for the fragmentation of order flow, for which the differences are
maximized."' They find that the quality of the market is superior where the
order flow is fragmented and conclude that fragmentation does not harm
market quality while the ensuing competition brought about with
fragmentation benefits society.8 9
There is extensive literature on estimating the costs of adverse selection
and finding the costs to be significant.' 9 Trading structures which can
reduce the ability of informed traders to pick off uninformed traders can
provide a benefit for which some investors would be willing to pay.
Obviously, large adverse selection costs affect the cost of market making,
and that cost must be passed along to consumers or the market makers will
go out of business.' 9' Additionally, adverse selection will also result in
lower gross expected
returns to uninformed investors, even ignoring
192
transactions costs.
Notwithstanding cites to the economics literature documenting that
adverse selection creates a cost to trading, one might wonder how this is
so since if one sells a share of stock at a given moment at a price of fifty
dollars and the price rises shortly thereafter to sixty dollars, it might seem
not to matter whether the person who bought the stock knew the price was
going up. The explanation is contained in averaging across transactions.
When one trades with an uninformed trader, sometimes the price will
move favorably and sometimes unfavorably, but on average it will even
out. However, when trading with informed traders the price will never
move favorably and there will be no averaging out. Unexpected losses
from unfavorable price movements after trading with uninformed traders
will be washed out by unexpected gains from trading with uninformed

188. See id. at 72.
189. See id. at 72-73.
190. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Glosten &Lawrence E. Harris, Estimatingthe Componentsof the
Bid/Ask Spread,21 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 123 (1988); Ji-Chai Lin et al., Trade Size and Components
of the Bid-Ask Spread,4 REV. FIN. STUD. 1153, 1153 (1995).
191. See Stoll, supra note 29, at 266 ("In competitive markets, the bid/ask spread reflects the
cost of providing dealer services-for dealers will not stay in business unless they are compensated
for their costs, and new dealers will enter if profits are too great.").
192. See Klock, supra note 183, at 334-35 (stating that adverse selection lowers expected
returns and thereby lowers the level of public investment and raises the cost of capital which is why
a prohibition on insider trading is good). It should be noted that some readers might confuse
informed traders with sophisticated traders. Professional fund managers and NASDAQ market
makers are sophisticated traders who are knowledgeable about the market; however, they are not
what is meant by informed traders. Informed traders are those with information which is not
publicly available, such as corporate officers. Note that informed trading is not necessarily illegal
inside trading if the information is not material. For example, an officer who knows his managerial
skills are better than what the market thinks and buys stock on that knowledge would be an
informed trader but not an illegal trader.
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traders. Unexpected losses from trading with informed traders will not be
similarly offset however, and these losses create costs to the dealers which
they must recoup.
The possibility of adverse selection also impacts trading in a more
subtle way. Instinet provides reduced adverse price movement by not
revealing the identity of the party wishing to trade or the amount they wish
to trade.'93 It also has been the case that the order was not revealed to the
whole universe, and there could be good economic reasons for desiring
this. Specifically, it is well understood that placing a limit order or making
a firm quote involves giving a free option to those with superior
information. 94 For example, if someone knows the price of a security is
about to move up, and I have placed a limit order to sell at a limit price
which is below the inside market maker's ask, and my limit order is visible
to the world, that informed trader can exercise the option I have given up
and hit my order. The option has value which means giving it up entails
costs. The more people the option is given to, the higher the potential
expected costs. Giving the option to a smaller subset of the universe lowers
these costs. To the extent that dealers and institutions could save costs,
these costs could be passed along to the public in the form of lower charges
for services. Regulation ATS effectively takes away this method of
achieving cost reductions.
IV. ALLEGED HARM OF FRAGMENTED MARKETS

A. Inferior Prices
It has been alleged that the proliferation of ATS was leading to market
fragmentation and that market fragmentation then resulted in worse
prices. 95 It is not clear what is meant by worse prices since a worse price
for a buyer is a better price for a seller. There are two reasonable
interpretations. One is that it leads to slower speed of adjustment-i.e.,
when the equilibrium price of a security changes in response to new
information the market price is in disequilibrium for a longer time.'9 6 The
other interpretation is that worse prices refers merely to different prices in
different markets.
The idea that market fragmentation might result in slower price
adjustments is interesting. Economic theory tends to focus on analysis of

193. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 18, at 195 n.17.
194. See O'HARA, supra note 10, at 197.
195. See Regulation ATS, supranote 1, at 70845 (alleging that ATS operating outside of the
national market system deny public investors the best prices).
196. See O'HARA, supra note 10, at 270 ("How well and how quickly a market aggregates and
impounds information into the price must surely be a fundamental goal of market design.").
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equilibrium197 since it is difficult to model disequilibrium. 98 Economic
theory has little to say about price adjustment paths much less the speed at
which prices adjust.19 9 Indeed, in many simplified economic models
transaction costs are assumed to be zero and disequilibrium never exists.
"[One] consequence of the assumption of zero transaction costs, not
usually noticed, is that, when there are no costs of making transactions, it
costs nothing to speed them up, so that eternity can be experienced in a
split second." 2 '
Nevertheless, the idea that fragmentation might slow price dynamics
does raise several interesting empirical questions. First, do prices in fact
adjust more slowly? Second, if so, how much more slowly (for example,
does it take two minutes instead of one minute for equilibrium to occur
after an earnings announcement)? Third, does the magnitude of any slower
price adjustment warrant any concetn?
These empirical questions are more difficult to address than one might
imagine. The difficulty is that it is not generally possible to observe price
adjustment because we only observe a market price when a transaction
takes place.2 °' Many securities do not trade that frequently, so prices adjust
without being observed.2 2 While quoted prices might be observed on a
continuous basis, the quotes do not represent prices of actual transactions.
Nevertheless, there have been studies which allow us to indirectly
address these empirical questions. Empirical economic research has found
that securities markets are integrated rather than fragmented.2 °3 In other
words, where parallel markets exist, the information contained in
transactions in one market is quickly reflected in the other markets so that
all the markets effectively operate as a single market. ' 4 These studies do

197. See id. at 4. Equilibrium is defined as any state which will persist indefinitely unless
disturbed. See id. Prices which are "too" high (or too low) are not equilibrium prices because they
cannot persist since the quantity supplied will exceed (or be less than) the quantity desired. See id.
198. See id. (stating that no trading is allowed outside of equilibrium).
199. See Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J.FIN. ECON. 71, 71-72 (1985)
(stating that"[classical price theory... has little to say about the dynamics of matching buyers and
sellers"); O'HARA, supranote 10, at 270 ("One difficulty is that the notion of dynamic efficiency,
or the speed with which prices reflect full information, is not well defined.").
200. CoASE, supra note 71, at 15.
201. See O'HARA, supra note 10, at 175 ("Only actual trades give useful information on the
direction of any signal . . ").
202. Cf.id. at 176 ("[E]mpirical investigations using transaction data will be biased because
examining only transaction prices ignores the information content contained in the nontrading
intervals.").
203. See McInish & Wood, supranote 176, at 85 ("As we and others have found, the satellites
do contribute meaningfully to price discovery.").
204. See id. at 63 ("[M]ost competitors are informationally linked, so that all participants
observe each others' trades and quotes within seconds of their execution.").
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not tell us whether prices adjust a little more slowly in parallel markets, but
they do tell us that prices do not adjust much more slowly. Otherwise the
data would not support a finding that the markets are integrated.0 5
Even assuming then that market fragmentation might lead to a few
extra minutes of price adjustment, it is difficult to imagine that this could
have a measurable impact on long-term capital formation and the overall
economy.' 6 In any case, there is no data which suggests that parallel
markets lead to even a few additional minutes of disequilibrium.
Furthermore, the technological developments which we are experiencing
in the speed of communications suggests adjustment periods can only get
shorter.2 7 There is no basis for any concern along this line of inquiry which
would justify expansive and expensive new regulations.
The other interpretation one can put on worse prices-merely that
securities might trade at different prices simultaneously-appears to be the
Commission's primary concern." 8 This is a misplaced concern. First of all,
every commodity trades at different prices simultaneously. People
simultaneously purchase gasoline, apples, bicycles, and other products of
identical quality at differing prices at the same time without governmental
intervention. If prices are much higher or lower in one market, people
cease to buy in that market or the market runs out of the commodity.2 , If
the prices are slightly different, transactions might continue to take place
without any apparent need for government regulations attempting to
centralize order flow. The point is that markets must and do correct
themselves. 0 Second, even if ATS were banned outright, securities would
be simultaneously traded at different prices. This is because while a broker
has a fiduciary duty to find a customer with the best available price, it has
been settled in the case law that this obligation is fulfilled by giving the
customer the inside quoted price.2 ' Thus if a broker-dealer gets a
customer's order to buy and another customer's order to sell, and the inside
quotes are $20 and $20.25, the broker-dealer can (and in practice does) sell

205. See Arshanapalli & Doukas, supra note 5, at 264 ("[U]nder normal trading conditions,
the stock and futures markets comprise virtually one market.").
206. Cf. O'HARA, supra note 10, at 270-71 (stating that it is unclear how fast prices should
adjust to achieve the maximum benefits to society).
207. Cf. Kenneth D. Garbade & William L. Silber, Dominantand SatelliteMarkets:A Study
of Dually-Traded Securities, 61 REV. ECON. & STAT. 455, 455 (1979) (hypothesizing that as
communication costs approach zero, fragmented markets approach perfect integration).
208. See supra note 7.
209. See Macey & Haddock, supra note 8, at 341 (stating that orders will naturally gravitate
to the market providing the best price).
210. See Harris, supra note 68, at 285 ("Arbitrageurs... ensure that asset prices are always
approximately equal whenever and however the asset is traded.").
211. See In re Merrill Lynch Sec. Litig., 911 F. Supp. 754,771 (D. N.J. 1995).
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to the one customer at $20.25 and buy from the other at $20.212 In other
words, the broker-dealer can internalize the two orders without making
them accessible to each other and can transact against them at different
prices. This conflict of interest would seem to be a more serious problem
than regulation of ATS, but the SEC is not attempting to discourage this
practice based on its exemption of internal systems from the new
regulatory framework. 2 3 Therefore it is difficult to understand why trading
at one price on NASDAQ and another price on Instinet is viewed as a
serious problem.
The SEC does have anecdotal (but not statistically significant) evidence
that the same broker-dealer sometimes provides different quotes on the
same side of a transaction in different markets. 4 In other words, the
broker-dealer might display a quote showing a willingness to sell at $20.25
on NASDAQ while displaying another quote showing a willingness to sell
at $20.125 within Instinet. It is claimed that this is unfair.215 Yet one has to
remember that the markets are structured differently with different rules
and different players and that these structural differences can serve a useful
economic purpose.21 6 One market is a large anonymous market in which
informed players might easily hide. 7 The adverse selection costs of
quoting in such a market are high and must be covered.218 A proprietary
ATS might just be open to financial institutions which do business with
one another on a regular basis. In this case adverse selection costs are low,
and given competition between fragmented markets the cost savings will
be passed on to the customers. 9 There is nothing malevolent or unfair
about this.
Much of the SEC's concern about providing equal access is at least
superficially directed at protecting the comparatively small investor.22 0 In
other words, it is an equity argument. If this is an argument, the "small"
investor should be identified. It seems unlikely that the small investor is a
starving homeless person needing protection. It seems unlikely that it is
even one of the working poor or middle class as these individuals save
through financial intermediaries such as mutual funds. The likely scenario
is that the small investor is the affluent, well-educated individual who has

212. See id. at 770. The plaintiffs' allegations underlying the case were that the defendants did
this. See id.

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See Regulation ATS, supra note 1, at 70854.
See id. at 70845.
See id. ("these systems have no obligation to provide investors a fair opportunity").
See Harris, supra note 68, at 274-75.
Cf. id. at 279 (informed traders try to remain anonymous).

218. See Stoll, supra note 29, at 267-68.

219. See id. at 266 ("[N]ew dealers will enter if profits are too great.").
220. See Regulation ATS, supra note 1, at 70865. Commission desires to make best price
available to all investors without regard to size or sophistication. See id.
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chosen to manage his own substantial stock portfolio himself rather than
turn it over to a fund manager. It is not at all clear why such people need
government protection from the securities industry and why the entire ATS
industry should have to bear the substantial costs of Regulation ATS. It
appears that the SEC is trying to deter specific undesirable transactions by
prospectively deterring the entire market when such instances might be
more effectively dealt with in another manner.22
The more likely scenario is that the SEC is attempting to protect the
order flow of the two dominant players-the NYSE and NASDAQ.
B. FreeRiding
Another allegation is that when markets are fragmented, there is a free
rider problem. 222 One market invests in price discovery while the other
markets simply ride for free off the dominant market's quotes. This view
is refuted by work cited herein; but if the view were valid it raises the
question of whether the better solution is to provide property rights
protection to quotes or to encumber ATS with stifling regulation.
In the Coasian spirit, I think that any perceived problems
inherent in the competition/fragmentation debate can be
mitigated via the allocation of property rights rather than by
the extension of the arm of the SEC. What I have in mind is
placing more solid property rights to listing in the hands of
the listing corporations. Both initial listing decisions as well
as additional trading locations would be at the discretion of
corporations and would not be co-opted by the SEC' s grant of
unlisted trading privileges. As Coase has taught us, this clear
definition of property rights in listing would internalize
the cost-benefit trade-offs involved in the
competition/fragmentation debate and would lead to the
optimal number of trading locations for all publicly traded
securities. The nice thing about the property-rights approach
is that the amount of off-board trading for each security is
determined by the invisible hand of the market rather than the
visible, and clumsy, hand of the SEC.223
Tying the hands of innovative entering markets could well be a cure
worse than the disease. It has long been accepted in economics that
regulation creates entry barriers which disadvantage new firms at the
221. Cf. Macey & Haddock, supra note 8, at 346 (pointing out the availability of private
causes of action under Rule 1Ob-5 as an effective enforcement mechanism).
222. See Mclnish & Wood, supra note 176, at 85 ("Accusing satellite competitors of cream
skimming and free riding ... ").
223. Mulherin, supra note 125, at 77.
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expense of established firms. 4 In any case, the empirical evidence
supports the position that U.S. equity markets are well integrated, and
causality runs in both directions.' In other words, while transactions in
the dominant markets provide information which impacts prices in the
other markets, transactions in the other markets provide information which
impacts prices in the dominant markets as well. Ifthe other markets were
simply free riding, the causality would only run one direction and statistical
analysis of the data would reveal that.
C. Paymentfor OrderFlow andFraud
Yet another issue which has been raised is that market fragmentation
leads to questionable practices such as payment for order flow. 6 In other
words, an ATS pays a broker to send orders to the ATS for execution. The
broker can do this because the ATS agrees to execute the orders at a price
at least as good as the national best bid or offer, thus the broker has not
violated any legal duty.227 While there does not appear to be anything
improper about such behavior, especially given that brokers engaging in
this, disclose it to their customers, and given that customers can direct
brokers to execute their orders in a specific manner on a specific exchange,
there seems to be some unarticulated concern that this practice is wrong.
Of course in a competitive environment, any payments for order flow
ultimately get passed on to the customers in the form of lower costs.
These issues have resulted in a flurry of academic research on payment
for order flow and preferencing. The studies conclude that these practices
have not negatively affected market quality.' Furthermore, there are
models which actually demonstrate that these practices perform a useful
function by giving brokers an incentive to separate the orders of informed
traders from uninformed traders.' 29 The SEC's desire to give everyone
access to the best possible price is in effect a policy of giving informed
traders their best possible price at the public expense.'
224. See Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectiveson the PoliticsofRegulation, in HANDBOOK
OFINDUSTRIALORGANIZATION 1253, 1266 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds. 1989)
("[A]Il forms of regulation are likely to retard entry by new firms.").
225. See Mclnish & Wood, supra note 176, at 85.
226. See Lightfoot et al., supra note 82, at 1.
227. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 18, at 207.
228. See Battalio et al., supra note 67, at 970 (arguing that market fragmentation occurring
from this activity does not adversely affect market quality); Battalio, supranote 81, at 341 (arguing
that trading costs did not increase when Bernard L. Madoff Investment securities began purchasing
order flow); Hansch et al., supra note 86, at 2-3 (explaining that these practices do not result in
inferior execution, and dealer profits are zero); Lightfoot et al., supra note 82, at 4 (stating that
there is no evidence that these arrangements have damaged market quality).
229. See Harris, supra note 5, at 578.
230. Cf.O'HARA, supra note 10, at 271 (suggesting that "society might prefer to give
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One more complication raised by the issue of market fragmentation is
that ATS might be used as a tool to manipulate the market in violation of
Rule 10b-5. 31 Indeed, the SEC cited instances of this occurring in
justifying RegulationATS. 232 However, in the instances cited, there was a
remedy-prosecution of those who violated Rule 10b-5 .23 The SEC did
not allege that undetected Rule 10b-5 violations are occurring due to the
rise of ATS. To the extent that an ATS could be used as a tool to
manipulate the market, it would seem more efficient to deal with such
instances via prosecutions after the fact than to prospectively deal with
inchoate violations by tying the hands of new entrants and forcing a
common market structure on everyone.
D. PriceDiscrimination
The final concern with fragmented markets is that they create an
opportunity for market makers to charge different prices for the same item
at the same time.2' One could make a plausible argument that this
constitutes illegal price discrimination under Robinson-Patman. The
economic rationale underlying anti-price discrimination policies is that a
monopolist charging different prices to different customers is able to
extract more of the gains of trade leaving less consumer surplus.2 5 Books
and courses on antitrust law tend to deemphasize Robinson-Patman, noting
that few government initiated actions are brought now.2 6 However, the law
is not dead,237 and the SEC's RegulationATS could be characterized as
merely an attempt to circumvent the statutory defenses of RobinsonPatman in order to put an end to lawful price discrimination. There are two
reasons why any actual price discrimination occurring by market makers
quoting different prices is unlikely to be illegal. First of all, price
discrimination is permitted when there is a cost justification.23 Since a

uninformed traders more rents and informed traders less").
231. See Regulation ATS, supra note 1, at 70845.
232. See id. at 78045 n.5.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 70845.
235. See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 277 (1988).
236. See ERNEST GELUIORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS INA NUTSHELL405 (1986);
see also A.D. NEALE,THE ANTIRUSTLAWS OFTHEUNITED STATES OFAMERICA467 (1970) ("An
element of 'underdoggery' has been noted in the enforcement of the [antitrust] prohibitions ....
No branch of the law is more open to this type of criticism than that dealing with price
discrimination ....).
237. A WESTLAW search on Robinson-Patman during the 1990s revealed at least eight cases
in which the government published a consent agreement, rule, proposed rule, or guide related to
Robinson-Patman in the Federal Register. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission File No. 0061
(Aug. 1, 1996), 61 F.R. 40229 (discussing the Robinson-Patman Act).
238. See 1 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS MTHMD) 420-26
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component cost of market making is adverse selection and adverse
selection costs differ across markets,239 it is easy to raise a costjustification
defense. Secondly, the only reason price discrimination is illegal is to
prevent monopolists from extracting additional consumer surplus.240
Market makers operate in a competitive environment." Other market
makers offer exactly the same security, and there are virtually no barriers
to market making so market makers must compete with potential entrants
as well as incumbent competitors.24 2 The SEC could refer the quotation of
different prices to the Department of Justice for action. If the govermnent
cannot make a price-discrimination case because the price discrimination
which occurs is neither illegal nor undesirable from a public policy
perspective, it does not seem reasonable for the SEC to attack such pricing
in a roundabout way through regulation which will impose costs on the
industry, create barriers to competition, and force the same model on
everyone thereby deterring innovation in the development of markets. 243
V. ANALYSIS OF SEC's RULEMAKING
The SEC's new regulatory framework for ATS is focused on
transparency and fair access; however, it is clear that the regulatory
environment does not reflect economic reality.2' The SEC's underlying
idea is clearly that there should be a centralized market where every trader
has a fair opportunity to get the best price.245 There are a plethora of
problems with this simplistic view. These problems are grouped into six
general categories. First, the SEC has based its regulatory framework on
several incorrect assumptions and has attempted to force the same
(inadequate) economic model on all financial market participants. Second,

(1992).
239. See Stoll, supra note 29, at 267-68.
240. See MANSFIELD, supra note 235, at 275 (stating that the concept of price discrimination
is raised solely in the context of monopoly).
241. See Sunil Wahal, Entry, Exit, Market Makers, and the Bid-Ask Spread, 10 REV. FIN.

871, 872 (1997).
242. See id. ("The NASDAQ National Market (NNM) is characterized by a virtual absence of
barriers to entry.").
243. See Mclnish & Wood, supra note 176, at 91. "In our opinion if the PTSs were able to
compete without any regulatory obstacles, the costs of trading services presently paid by the
institutional buy-side to the sell-side would be reduced by 50-75 percent." Id.
STUD.

244. Cf.Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Finn: The Emergence
of CloseSubstitutesfortheNew Yorkand Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELLL. REV. 1007, 1010

(1990) ("We find that regulatory initiatives taken in the wake of the market decline of October,
1987 completely misperceive the modem economic reality ....
").
245. Cf.Macey& O'Hara, supra note 18, at 189 (referring to SEC efforts as "[w]ell-meaning
attempts to mandate best execution as a consumer-protection device run counter to attempts to make
markets less centralized and more competitive").
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the SEC is attempting to deal with the fact that some individual
transactions might occur simultaneously at different prices by tying the
hands of all markets and expecting everything else to remain constant. This
is inefficient, and the policy is based on partial equilibrium analysis-in
other words, it ignores the unintended, but very real, consequences of the
policy and fails to identify the full costs of regulation. Third, the new
regulatory framework is inconsistent with the historical role of the SEC.
Fourth, the SEC's justifications for the new regulation are inadequate on
their face. Fifth, the SEC has ignored economic evidence. Finally, the SEC
is attempting to do that which it cannot define. It has an unmanageable task
and is doomed to snarl the evolution of U.S. financial markets.
A. ErroneousAssumptions
There are several erroneous critical assumptions implicit in the SEC's
analysis. The SEC has historically disliked fragmentation and assumed that
fragmentation is necessarily bad.2 6 As indicated earlier though, the
economic model which would support this view, however, is based on
unrealistic assumptions. "[Tihe concept of a Walrasian auction is implicit
in many models of financial market equilibrium... it is clear that it fails
to provide an adequate description of the trading structure of real
markets. 24 7
[T]he Walrasian auctioneer does not take any trading position,
but serves only to redirect quantities from sellers to buyers.
Moreover, this auction activity is costless, so there are no
frictions in the exchange process. The equilibrium price thus
emerges as the natural outcome of an unseen trading game in
which buyers and sellers costlessly exchange assets."'
If there were no costs to trading, financial markets would not have
developed. 9 The reason for their existence is that they have evolved to
facilitate transactions at lower (but not zero) cost than individuals could."
In reality, there are costs to trading stemming from several sources." 1

246. See Garbade & Silber, supra note 207, at 456 (noting that the SEC is concerned with
fragmentation "despite an absence of evidence on the degree of fragmentation"); Macey &
Haddock, supra note 8, at 341 ("The SEC apparently thinks that [fragmentation] is necessarily
bad."). Macey and Haddock question the SEC's belief that fragmentation will hurt investors. See
id.
247. Garbade & Silber, supra note 207, at 456.
248. O'HARA, supra note 10, at 4.
249. See COASE, supra note 71, at 7.
250. See id.
251. See Stoll, supra note 29, at 266.
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There are order processing costs. 2 Liquidity, or immediacy, is provided
by a market maker.253 This ability to obtain immediacy at low (but not
zero) cost requires that the market maker carry an inventory. 4 Carrying an
inventory requires capital, on which the market maker must earn a
competitive rate of return. 5 It also requires that the market maker take on
risk from different sources. 6 One risk is the risk associated with general
volatility in prices. 7 Another risk is the risk associated with trading with
an informed trader. 8 These risks create costs to the market maker for
which he must be compensated. 9 The optimal way for society to ensure
that the costs are minimized is through competition between parallel
6 Market makers who cannot cover their costs will go out of
markets.W
2
business. 61Competition provides the incentive to keep costs at a minimum
because those market makers who do not minimize their costs will not be
able to cover their costs in a competitive environment.
This raises another of the critical assumptions implicit in the SECs
framework: that technology is fixed. Technology related to the speed of
communications, order processing, clearing, record keeping, and the like
is clearly evolving and so goes the evolution of financial markets,
including the rules under which they operate. In other words, the rules
themselves are endogenous--or an outcome-to the process, not merely
an input to it. Competition is the tool of evolution which ensures
adaptation and cost minimization to survive.
The usual economic view of markets is as a place where
buyers and sellers come together and trade at a common price,
the price at which supply equals demand. Securities
exchanges are often singled out as excellent examples of
markets that operate this way. In fact, however, trading on
exchanges takes place over time, and some institutional
arrangements are necessary to help match buyers and sellers
whose orders arrive at different times.262
Part of market-microstructure research is about how these institutional

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 266-67.
See id.
See id. at 267.
See id. at 267-68.
See id. at 266.
See id.
See id.
Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 199, at 71.
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arrangements affect the performance of the market and how the rules might
evolve in response to changes.
One way in which technological progress is encouraged is through the
protection of property rights in intellectual capital. Professor Mulherin and
his colleagues have persuasively argued that price quotes are a form of
intellectual property which were historically protected, and that a return to
the application of this view, rather than the view that exchanges are
monopolists which should have their quotes taken away in the public good,
will promote more competition and innovation in the financial sector.263
Part of the problem with these assumptions is not only that they are in
error, but that they are an effort to treat different kinds of market
participants in the same manner and force the same model on everyone.
Dealers do not trade for the same motives as public investors .264 Informed
traders do not trade for the same motives as uninformed traders.265
Suppliers of liquidity do not trade for the same motives as demanders of
liquidity."s This creates opportunities for parallel markets to compete for
order flow on different performance attributes using product
differentiation.267 Forcing the same economic model on everyone stifles
competition.268 An analogy might be a government regulation requiring car
dealers to compete only on price and not on interest rates, service
departments, product brands, or features. Even if such a regulation were to
succeed in preventing different people from paying different prices for the
exact same car at the same time, it would clearly have unintended effects
on the volume of cars sold, the prices at which cars sold, the service
obtained, and the satisfaction of all participants in the car market.
Yet another unrealistic critical assumption implicit in the SEC's
analysis is the view that all traders have the same information and trade for
the same reasons. 269 This causes a particularly significant deviation
between theory and reality. A somewhat technical explanation is provided
in the financial economics literature:
The presence of traders with superior information leads to a
positive bid-ask spread even when the specialist is riskneutral and makes zero expected profits. The resulting
transaction prices convey information .... A bid ask spread
263. See Mulherin et al., supra note 73, at 643-44.
264. See generally Harris, supranote 68, at 275-89 (describing differences in traders and the
differing trading structures preferred by traders).
265. See id. at 278-79.
266. See id. at 282.
267. See id. at 270.
268. Cf. id. at 274 ("Any regulatory efforts to impose a consolidated system risk choosing the
wrong system and/or stifling innovations.").
269. See id. at 272.
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implies a divergence between observed returns and realizable
returns. Observed returns are approximately realizable returns
plus what the uninformed anticipate losing to the insiders.270
In other words, rules which enable parties to distinguish between informed
and uninformed traders and direct the corresponding orders to different
markets can lower costs (and raise returns) and promote social welfare.
B. PartialEquilibriumAnalysis
A different type of problem with the SEC's framework altogether is that
it is an effort to prospectively cure a hypothetical problem. The SEC is
concerned that some traders might not get the best price or might offer the
best price but not get the trade. While it is certainly true that there have
been transactions where a trade was executed at a price other than the best
available or not executed when it would have been the best price, there is
no evidence that this is a problem requiring government intervention into
the way that markets are structured and can evolve. Most people are likely
to shop at the store where they expect to get the best price for the service
desired knowing that on some occasions they will pay more than they
might have elsewhere. Over time, volume tends to gravitate towards the
better stores and away from the worse ones. 27 ' The government does not
jump in to regulate retail sales just because someone pays a higher price
one day at one of the better stores.
The problem with such a government action, is that it is based on
partial equilibrium analysis.272 In other words, the focus is on one
transaction in isolation holding everything else constant. The SEC is
concerned that a customer might pay "too much" in an isolated transaction.
As a result, the SEC has constructed a set of regulations aimed to prevent
this. An economist utilizing generalequilibrium analysis would recognize
that in equilibrium everything else can not be held constant.273 When the
rules of the market are changed, there will be other effects as well.274 For
example, it is well known that displaying a quote or limit order is giving

270. Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 199, at 71.
271. Cf. Macey & Haddock, supranote 8, at 341 (stating that orders will gravitate towards the
best markets).
272. See Klock, supranote 183, at 304-09 (discussing an example of how partial equilibrium
analysis has been used to generate other faulty policy recommendations for securities regulation).
273. See id. at 330-32 (discussing how general equilibrium analysis should be used to generate
better policy recommendations).
274. See id. at 330-31 (explaining that if insider trading were permitted, there would not
simply be a redistribution between insiders and other, but a shrinking of the whole pie available for
distribution as outsiders scale back their investment due to the lower expected returns).
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a free option to the world and informed traders.' Therefore, the display
and access requirements of RegulationATS have the effect of forcing some
traders to give free options to a larger universe than they otherwise would
have had to. An unintended consequence of this could be that market
makers will simply quote wider spreads, reducing the value of the free
options the government has forced them to give up. Then traders, knowing
that the wide spreads do not reflect true prices have to spend more time
searching for the best available and true price. Social welfare is worse. To
take the analysis to a higher level, the fact that all market makers are forced
to focus competition along the same dimension-price-can reduce
incentives to compete in other dimensions, reduce incentives to invest in
innovation, and in the extreme could drive markets offshore. There are
consequences when governments try to regulate a price.
C. The SEC's HistoricalRole in
FinancialMarketRegulation
Davis and Lightfoot provide an historical overview on the SEC's views
towards competition and fragmentation noting that in the early 1960s, the
SEC, while beginning to show concern over fragmentation, nevertheless
concluded that the benefits resulting from competition between markets
exceeded any detrimental effects from not consolidating orders. 6 Then,
in 1971 the SEC acknowledged a shift in its historic position favoring
consolidation of the market. 77 This more recent position is entirely at odds
with the SEC's historical philosophy.27 The historic philosophy of the
SEC has been one of non-paternalism. 9 The SEC saw its role as being one
of protecting the integrity of the market place, but not one of passing
judgment.280 In moving to consolidate the market, the SEC is making a
judgment about the optimal structure of the market rather than allowing the
structure to evolve naturally.

275. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 18, at 215.
276. See Jeffrey L. Davis & Lois E. Lightfoot, FragmentationVersus Consolidation of
SecuritiesTrading:Evidencefrom the Operationof Rule 19c-3, 41 J.L. ECON. 209,210 (1998).
277. See id.
278. Cf. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 18, at 217 ("The introduction of these rules reflects a
shift in focus toward a more pro-active regulator role. The NASD, which opposed the Order
Execution Rules, has urged the SEC to allow market forces to improve competition, rather than
embark on wholesale market redesign through regulation.").
279. See MARC I.'STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (1986) ("Undoubtedly, the central
focus of the securities laws is that of disclosure, thereby providing shareholders and the marketplace
with sufficient information to make relevant decisions and to be apprised of significant
developments.").
280. See id. at 15 ("It should be understood that the securities laws were designed to facilitate
informed investment analyses and prudent and discriminating investment decisions by the investing
public. It is the investor, not the Commission, who must make the ultimate judgment .... ).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 5 [1999], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have some relevant thoughts on a
different topic. In reviewing the corporate charter, they note that although
we have fifty-one differentjurisdictions writing corporate laws, those laws
have tended to evolve towards each other and are more similar than
dissimilar.2"' Corporate law is essentially enabling rather than disabling." 2
Managers are protected by the business judgement rule. 8 3 Managers
actions are essentially unconstrained. 2 The question which arises from
these observations is, why regulate the manner in which investors can
place an order for the transfer of stock with more scrutiny than the manner
in which managers can waste investors' assets? For that matter, one broker
might charge a commission twenty times greater than another broker, but
that has been deregulated rather than regulated. Why should the SEC be
concerned that an ATS might have provided a price 1/16th better but been
unavailable to a customer when the SEC is not concerned that the customer
might have lost more than that paying more than the lowest available
brokerage fee?
D. The SEC's Ceremonial Whoosh-Whooshing
Regulation ATS is full of long phrases, but short on substance and
persuasive reasoning. The document asserts that the new regulations will
"strengthen public markets for securities," but it is not clear what that
means. 285 In context, such a statement could mean increasing the
profitability of incumbent financial markets. One should question whether
this is a suitable objective for public policy. The document also refers to
a policy of having "equally regulated" markets, but again it is not clear
what this means or why it is desirable. 286 It is certainly feasible that markets
which are structured differently, have different rules, different technology,
and different participants require different regulations. At one point, the
document mentions "competitive restrictions on access to market
information and other systems," but it is not clear what the term means or
how competitive restrictions
differ from noncompetitive restrictions or
2 7
simply restrictions.

281. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF

CORPORATE LAW 5 (1991) (explaining that states compete to offer rules which work best).
282. See id. at 2.

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See id.
See id. at 2-3.
Regulation ATS, supra note 1, at 70845.
Id.
Id. at 70858.
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RegulationATS presents facts as if they were per se evil. For example,
Through Instinet, market makers were able to quote prices
better than those made available to public investors. This
private market developed only because the activity on
alternative trading systems is not fully disclosed, or
accessible, to public investors. Moreover, these trading
systems have no obligation to provide investors a fair
opportunity to participate
in their systems or to treat their
288
participants fairly.
As stated earlier, if a business quotes different prices to different customers
there is no apparent need for the government to jump in with massive
regulations. It is widely reported in the popular press the U.S. military
occasionally pays $400 for a $20 hammer or toilet seat. Why then so much
concern that an affluent investor might pay $40.625 for a share which
could have been obtained for $40.50? One might make a plausible
argument that this constitutes illegal price discrimination.2

9

If such a case

could be made, it should be pursued under those laws. If not, then the new
regulation is merely an attempt to circumvent the defenses contained under
the anti-price discrimination law. Once again, there are at least two reasons
why the activity is likely not illegal price discrimination. First of all, the
economic theory underlying price discrimination is that a price
discriminating monopolist is able to extract more of the gains from trade
with consumers, and this is considered undesirable. 290 However, financial
markets are certainly not monopolists in the current competitive
environment. Secondly, price discrimination is permitted under the law if
there is a cost justification for charging different prices.29 ' The adverse
selection related costs of market making are likely to be different in
different markets and could justify different quotes. 292 The academic
literature contains numerous empirical studies estimating the actual costs
of market making which are due to adverse selection.293 No studies exist
estimating the difference in these costs between ATS and exchanges since
data from ATS are not available, but it would be possible for the SEC to

288. Id. at 70845.
289. The law againstpricediscriminationis commonlycalled the Robinson-Patman Act. It has
been argued that the law is not used much anymore. See GELLHORN, supra note 236, at 405.
However, a search on WESTLAW revealed eight Robinson-Patman publicly published consent
orders in the past ten years.
290. See MANSFIELD, supra note 235, at 277.
291. See id. at 275.
292. See Hagerty & McDonald, supra note 4, at 36-37.
293. See, e.g., Glosten & Harris, supra note 190, at 123 (significant portion of spreads for
NYSE stocks is due to adverse selection).
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collect such data and determine whether the costs are different before
declaring a per se evil requiring regulation of the entire industry.
In general, Regulation ATS appears to be based on wild speculation.
The SEC asserts that trade on multiple markets "may also create
misallocations of capital, widespread inefficiency, and trading
fragmentation if markets are not coordinated.,, 294 Of course the beauty of
free markets as opposed to centrally coordinated markets is that arbitrage
creates powerful incentives to eliminate inefficiency and allocate resources
correctly.295 This is known as the "invisible hand" and explains the lack of
coordination among New York grocery stores in ordering the necessary
amounts of fresh produce daily.2' Government regulation in the absence
of any market imperfections can serve only to interfere with the process
and promote misallocations.297
Finally, in one of the better displays of ceremonial whooshwhooshing,29 the SEC, in fulfilling its statutory obligation to consider the
effects of rules on competition and not impose unnecessary burdens on
competition against the public interest, blindly asserts its belief that the
rules "would not likely impose any significant burden on competition not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the Exchange Act." 29

294. RegulationATS, supranote 1, at 70858. But see Harris, supranote 68, at 285 ("Markets
can consolidate even if no coordinated mechanism [exists] .... Proprietary electronic routing
systems ... make coordinated intermarket routing systems unnecessary.").
295. See Harris, supra note 68, at 274.
296. See RIcHARDG. LIPsEY&PETERO. STEINER, ECONOMIC 50 (1981) (describing the price
system as an invisible hand which "allows decision making to be decentralized under the control
of millions of individual producers and consumers but nonetheless to be coordinated").
297. See Harris, supra note 68, at 274.
298. Cf. Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. R.R., 161 F.2d 413,450 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947) (Frank, J., dissenting in part).
If... the Commission is sustained in this case, and, accordingly behaves similarly
in future cases, then its conduct will indeed be a mystery. Its so-called "valuations" will then be acceptable, no matter how contrived. In that event, it would be
desirable to abandon the word "valuation"--since that word misleadingly
connotes some moderately rational judgment-and to substitute some neutral
term, devoid of misleading associations, such as "valuation," or perhaps better
still, "woosh-woosh.".. . Then no one would be foolish enough to believe that the
figures in a Commission plan necessarily have anything to do with deliberation,
but everyone would know that the figures [and conclusions] might well have been
the product of... mystagogues.
Id. (Frank, J., dissenting in part).
299. Regulation ATS, supra note 1, at 70910.
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E. Economic Evidence
The SEC has completely ignored economic evidence on the relevant
issues. First of all, there are numerous studies which indicate that when
financial securities trade on multiple markets, those markets operate as a
single market. Obviously individual transactions will sometimes occur at
different prices close in time, but the evidence is that statistically
significant price differentials do not persist over time. This is exactly what
one would expect. Indeed, the economic literature sometimes takes it as
given that markets are fully integrated. Professor Harris, writing about the
relation between technology and trading systems, states:
Now that trading information is more widely disseminated,
traders no longer need to go to central exchanges. They now
go to whatever trading system best serves their specific needs,
confident that prices in that market segment will reflect
liquidity conditions in all other segments. New trading
systems have proliferated as entrepreneurs, exchanges,
brokers, and dealers compete to satisfy the liquidity demands
of diverse traders. 3"
One area which the SEC has clearly overlooked is the research on
preferencing. 30 ' By definition, preferencing can only occur in a fragmented
market. The economics literature contains numerous studies on the effect
of preferencing concluding that preferencing (and hence fragmentation)
does not damage U.S. equity markets in actuality. °2
Parallel markets provide at least three useful functions: customization;
competition; and technological innovation. The economics literature has
demonstrated how parallel markets can evolve to provide different
services, such as separating informed and uninformed order flow. 30 3 The
literature has also demonstrated that competition between markets is
beneficial, and that technological innovations tend to come from
competition.
The economics literature also provides a cost justification for price

300. Harris, supra note 68, at 272 (emphasis added).
301. See Robert Bloomfield & Maureen O'Hara, Does OrderPreferencingMatter?,50 J. FIN.
ECON. 3, 3 (1998) (explaining that preferencing allows brokers "to direct order flow to a specific
dealer regardless of that dealer's quoted prices").
302. See Battalio et al., supra note 67, at 970 (arguing that market fragmentation occurring
from this activity does not adversely affect market quality); Battalio, supra note 81, at 341 (stating
that trading costs did not increase when Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities began purchasing
order flow); Hansch et al., supra note 86, at 2-3 (explaining that these practices do not result in
inferior execution, and dealer profits are zero); Lightfoot et al., supra note 82, at 4 (stating that
there is no evidence that these arrangements have damaged market quality).
303. See Hagerty & McDonald, supra note 4, at 37.
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discrimination between publicly accessible markets and proprietary
markets in the form of reduced adverse selection costs. Indeed, the fact that
adverse selection contributes to a significant portion of transaction costs
is so widely known that it is cited outside the financial economics
literature. 3 ' The economics literature further demonstrates that when
capital is misallocated, economic forces provide incentives to reallocate
resources unless government regulation interferes.
There have also been experimental studies published in the economics
literature whereby experimental markets were created to determine the
effects of fragmented-related activity such as preferencing. The
experimental results have found that preferencing and payment for orderflow did not lead to a deterioration in market quality. 5
The SEC might defend its position by noting that there was opportunity
for public comment on Regulation ATS. 306 The SEC has two files
containing letters from the public. 31 These files contained seventy-six
letters and virtually all were from interested parties in industry. 31 Only
three letters appeared to be from academics, and none of those from
economists.3" It is not reasonable to expect that disinterested academic
economists who receive several thousand dollars a day for their time will
come out of the woodwork to volunteer time to do a literature search and
review for a federal agency. The SEC has a staff of highly qualified
economists who are capable of searching and reviewing the economics
literature. 31" The literature is written by disinterested objective academics
who merely wish to study and answer interesting questions about the

304. See generallyMaribeth Coller &Teri L. Yohn, Management Forecastsand Information
Asymmetry: An Examinationof Bid-Ask Spreads,35 J. ACCr. RES. 181, 181 (1997).
305. See generally Lucy F. Ackert & Bryan K. Church, Bid-Ask Spreads in Multiple Dealer
Settings: Some Experimental Evidence, 28 FIN. MGmr. 75, 75 (1999) (explaining that spreads
narrow in multiple dealer markets when individuals have the ability to compete using alternatives
to price such as payment for order flow); Christopher G. Lamoureux & Charles R. Schnitzlein,
When It's Not the Only Game in town: The Effect of BilateralSearch on the Quality of a Dealer
Market, 52 J. FIN. 683,683 (1997).
306. Cf. Regulation ATS, supra note 1, at 70845.
307. See id. at 70845 n.2-3.
308. See Public Files S7-16-97 & S7-12-98 available for inspection in the SEC Public
Reference Room.
309. See id.
310. Indeed, there is some evidence that the left arm of the agency does not know what the
right arm is doing. The SEC published a report on the practice of preferencing--of which a large
part was apparently written by the SEC's own economists-which carefully describes the
substantial adverse selection costs arising from trading securities. See Securities and Exchange
Commission, Report on the Practice of Preferencing (visited Oct. 19, 1999)
<http://www.sec.gov/newslstudieslprefrep.htm>. In that report, the Commission concluded that
preferencing has had a positive effect on financial markets because it has furthered the
fragmentation of order flow away from the NYSE. See id. at 5.
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structure of markets. When all of the public commentary comes from
interested parties in industry, much support is given to the view that the
SEC is pandering to political pressure.3"
F. Doing the Undefinable
One very large problem with the SEC's new regulatory framework
which tries to make the best price available to all is that the best price is an
amorphous concept which can probably not be defined.31 2 Is it the best
price at the instant the trade is executed? Or is it the best price at the
instant the order is placed? In a dynamic market one has to consider that
the rules will affect the behavior of the participants which could in turn
affect the volatility of prices and the time to execute transactions.313 If a
trade is made at a price which is better than any available at that instant,
but much worse than the price available one minute earlier or one minute
latter, is it a good price? If markets are allowed to compete in different
dimensions, one market might provide a guaranteed execution at a price
agreed to while another might provide guaranteed price improvement.1 4
In other words, one market might simply guarantee an execution inside the
NBBO, but not at any particular price as the NBBO could change in an
instant. Another market might guarantee execution at a known price. Some
investors might be willing to accept the risk that a better price could have
been out there somewhere, but not want to spend time looking for it and
risk that prices move in an unfavorable direction before it is found.315
Others might be willing to accept such a risk.
Another problem in defining best price occurs when large transactions
are made. If five-thousand shares are sold should one look at the price for
the first one-hundred in the order, the last one-hundred, the average price,
or the price of each group of one-hundred (all fifty lots) in determining
whether the trader had a shot at the best price. It is well known that some
systems do better than others for large transactions.1 6 An additional
problem occurs when one considers different priority rules. Does the first
order in time with the best price get the transaction? This is not an easy

311. See Macey & Haddock, supra note 8, at 361.
312. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 18, at 189.
313. See O'HARA, supra note 10, at 270-71.
314. NASDAQ's small order execution system (SOES) guarantees execution at a specific
price. Bernald L. Madofflnvestment Securities guaranteed execution atbetter than theNBBO when
the bid-ask spread was greater than an eighth. See Battalio, supra note 81, at 343.
315. See Harris, supra note 68, at 282.
316. See LaPlante & Muscarella, supranote 158, at 98 (stating that the structure of the NYSE
provides institutions more liquidity for large block transactions); Reinganum, supra note 158, at
137 (stating that the structure of the NASDAQ market provides more liquidity to small firms than
the structure of the NYSE, but this is not true for large firms).
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question if someone wants to sell two-hundred shares at market and one
person has a limit order to buy one-hundred shares at fifty and 1/16th while
another person put in a limit order to buy two-hundred shares two seconds
latter at fifty, and the market maker quotes were forty-nine and 7/8ths and
fifty and 1/8th. How should the order be filled? It is not easy to state who
had the best price, the one quoting fifty and 1/16th with no depth (only
one-hundred shares) or the one quoting fifty with more depth. The SEC
analysis assumes the former order is the best and must be displayed and
made available, but it simply is not clear. Competition occurs in many
dimensions besides price, including depth.
In the words of one eminent commentator, "Enforcing a single trading
venue in a global market is a task worthy of King Canute, and its pursuit
undoubtedly detracts from the ability of the market to meet all traders'
needs. 317
VI. CONCLUSION

On the surface, the impetus for Regulation ATS appears to be a
fundamental distrust of free markets coupled with a disdain for the fact that
some dealers in stocks have simultaneously quoted different prices in
public and private markets. Economic theory suggests that in a competitive
environment these price differentials could not persist without a cost
justification. There is a substantial amount of literature suggesting that the
benefits of competition between alternative markets outweigh the benefits
of consolidating order flow into a single market system. There is also a
substantial amount of literature suggesting that fragmentation of trading
has not damaged the performance of U.S. equity markets. The strong
tendency of free markets is to evolve to provide the lowest cost possible for
the attributes desired by the investing public.
Segmented securities markets are characterized by two
types of competition: traders compete for best price within a
given market structure, and market structures compete to
serve diverse traders. Unfortunately, policies that would
maximize the benefits from one type of competition can
decrease the benefits obtained from the other type of
competition. For example, if all trades in a given security
were consolidated by regulation into the same market, it
would be easy to find the best price for the security, but it
would be difficult or impossible for innovative trading
systems to develop and be adopted. Public policies therefore

317. O'HARA, supra note 10, at 269.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol51/iss5/1

44

Klock: The SEC's New Regulation Acts: Placing the Myth of Market Fragmen
1999]

SEC's NEWRnGULAT1ON ATS

797

benefits obtained from these two
may need to balance the
18
competitions.
types of
The SEC's approach is totally unbalanced.
Hence, the SEC has mandated expansive new regulation which will
impose additional burdens on the industry, particularly to competitive
threats to the established exchanges and NASD. The regulation will also
eliminate the ability of proprietary trading systems to continue to provide
certain benefits unless they move off-shore. The regulatory burdens
increase significantly for large systems, but the SEC has sent clear signals
that the volume thresholds it has established are subject to change. This
uncertainty in itself is a deterrent to potential entrants. "[A]bsent a better
understanding of either the markets or the transactions they are regulating,
the SEC has little choice but to choose a process and hope that it results in
the desired objective."3'19 This obviously presumes that the SEC knows its
objective and that the objective is desirable.
The thesis of this Article is that consideration of economic theory,
economic reality, and statistical analysis of data would lead to better policy
decisions than reliance on stories from industry professionals. Whether the
SEC is behaving in a manner which is politically rational, or whether the
SEC just has a "clumsy hand," the result is the same. The regulatory
burdens adopted favor the incumbents at the expense of the new arrivals
and stifle competition, innovation, and the optimal cost-minimizing
evolution of financial markets.

318. Harris, supra note 68, at 270.
319. Macey & O'Hara, supra note 18, at 198.
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